This book deals with a neglected episode in the history of logic and theories of cognition: the way in which conceptions of inference changed during the seventeenth century. The author focuses on the work of Descartes, contrasting his construal of inference as an instantaneous grasp in accord with the natural light of reason, with the Aristotelian view of inference as a discursive process. Gaukroger offers a new interpretation of Descartess contribution to the question, revealing it to be a significant advance over humanist and late Scholastic conceptions. He argues that Descartess account played a pivotal role in the development of our understanding of the nature of inference.
Abbreviations; Introduction; Descartes and traditional syllogistic: The scope of logic; The syllogism as a Petitio Principii; The heuristic role of syllogism; Descartess conception of inference: Conceptions of logic before Descartes; Conceptions of cognitive grasp before Descartes; The natural light of reason; Eternal truths: A human model for cognition; Discovery and proof: Analysis and discovery; Synthesis and proof; Appendix: The terms a priori and a posteriori in the Reply to the second set of objections to the meditations; Scientific reasoning: The method of discovery; The epistemic value of deduction; Conclusion; Bibliography; Index